Introduction
Minerva's owl only takes flight once the battle is over. Is the same true for rating agencies, which are frequently accused of only intervening after investors have become aware of a change in an issuer's default risk?
The relation that may exist between rating announcements and bond spreads is unclear.
Many event studies have focused on this problem. Norden and Weber (2004 : 2816 -2817 provide a synopsis of these studies. It appears that upgrades have little effect on bond prices, while downgrades may correspond to a change in bond spreads, especially if rating is low before the announcement (recently, Jorion and Zhang, 2007) ; however, in many cases, the change in bond spreads occurs prior to the downgrade (Grier and Katz, 1976; Hettenhouse and Sartoris, 1976; Weinstein, 1977; McCarthy and Melicher, 1988; Hite and Warga, 1997; Steiner and Heinke, 2001) . From a similar point of view, some authors wonder whether market-based indicators of default risk are more able to predict defaults than agency ratings.
According to Miller (1998) , considering ratings and market based indicators together provides a better prediction of default risk. A study by Delianedis and Geske (1999) shows that modifications to ratings can be anticipated a long time before the agencies' announcements. Kealhofer (2003) shows that accuracy of market-based indicators is more important than that of agency ratings. Di Cesare (2006) examines to what extent the analysis of CDS spreads, bonds and share prices allows changes in agency ratings to be anticipated; his analysis examines rating actions carried out by the three principal agencies considering debt issued by 42 international banks in the years 2001-5; the indicators retained allow negative rating events to be anticipated satisfactorily. Löffler (2007) finds that ratings cannot be replaced by statistical analysis, and, conversely, market-based indicators provide information different from that transmitted by ratings.
Such results cast doubt on the utility and the role of credit rating agencies in bond markets, which are generally supposed to transmit information about issuer default risk. Altman and Rijken (2004) examine whether rating agencies, in trying to strike a balance between timeliness and stability, are voluntarily late in disclosing rating modifications. By studying Standard & Poor's corporate companies' ratings for the period 1981-2001, and using a credit-scoring prediction, they point out that agencies' ratings mainly rely on permanent components of credit quality and tend to neglect transitory components. As a result, agency ratings do not respond immediately to a change in issuer credit quality and are anticipated by credit-scoring analysis. But this focus on permanent components of credit quality explains only part of the stability of ratings. The other reason lies in the migration policy adopted by agencies: before initiating a migration, they wait for the spread between the agency rating and actual issuer credit quality to exceed a certain threshold.
In the same spirit, but in a different theoretical setting, Löffler (2005) develops a ratingmigration model in order to explain the balance achieved by agencies between the accuracy and the stability of ratings. Because rating maps a continuous variable (the default risk) into discrete categories, the probability of a rating reversal decreases when a rating change is triggered by a threshold. This behavior not only leads to rating stability but explains the ratings lag changes in default risk. Cantor and Mann (2007) provide a case study illustrating the trade-off between accuracy and stability.
In a recent paper, Cheng and Neamtiu (2009) question the idea of a trade-off between timeliness and the accuracy of ratings. Studying the strategy of nationally recognized rating agencies before and after July 2002 (that is before and after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which required the SEC to study the role of credit rating agencies), they find that after July 2002 (i.e.
when the regulatory pressure increased), agencies improved both the timeliness and the accuracy of ratings, while rating volatility was reduced. They conclude that the lack of timeliness, observed in the past, cannot be attributed to an unavoidable trade-off with accuracy, but rather to the market power enjoyed by the agencies. Our paper leans in the same direction and contributes to the evidence that rating agencies no longer tend to have a function in transmitting information about the default risks of European corporate issuers
Theoretical analyses of the role of the CRAs (credit rating agencies) are not numerous. Boot et al. (2006) propose a study about the function of CRAs. They suggest that their role is to provide investors with a 'focal point' that allows the equalization of investor information and the coordination of their expectations. They put forward the idea that credit rating agencies have an important function in monitoring issuing firms through their credit watch procedures. For this reason they expect inclusions made on a watch list to be the most informative actions taken by an agency. Boot et al. are certainly right in arguing that credit ratings are used as 'focal points' in the bond markets. However, our empirical study does not confirm that investors react specifically to a credit watch procedure. In our paper, we also examine whether investors' reactions depend more on the kind of issuer or on the rating agency.
Our analysis is carried out on data concerning 13 European countries over a seven-year period (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) . We attempt to answer the following questions:
-Do rating agencies transmit information to investors about issuers' default risk? -Are investors' reactions different according to the characteristics of the issue (economic sector, issuer default risk before the rating action, currency, etc.) or the rating action (the agency, the magnitude and the severity of the rating action, etc.) ?
-If there is no information transmission, can we say that rating agencies are useless in European bond markets?
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we introduce the statistical tools needed for the study; in section 3 we present our results about the question of timeliness of ratings, and in section 4, a new explanation of the utility of ratings. The final section presents our conclusions.
Statistical tools: determining and dating investors' reactions

Objective
The aim of our empirical analysis is to examine the strategy of the rating agencies concerning the timeliness of their rating announcements, in order to infer their role in the European bond markets.
The timing of investors' reactions to the announcement of a change in rating is essential to our approach. We want to analyze the rating revisions issuer-by-issuer and eventby-event. Therefore, a methodology relying on structural changes in the spread series seems more appropriate for this analysis than classical methodologies that rely on cumulative abnormal returns. Several situations may be observed: there is no reaction (synonymous with an event providing no information or with the agency having no credibility); spreads change prior to the rating action; and spreads change after the rating action. Using a multicorrespondence analysis (MCA) and a cluster analysis, we carry out a segmentation of issuers based on the criterion of consistency in their reactions to rating actions.
Field of the study
The study covers Continental Europe (where rating was recently introduced) and the United Kingdom (where it is older). Thirteen countries are examined: 12 members of the euro area (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) and the UK.
The study begins with the launching of the euro on January 1, 1999, and ends seven years Given the fact that the market price of default risk evolves over time, it is necessary to take the business cycle into account when analyzing the impact of rating actions on the level of spreads. We chose to examine abnormal spreads (and not absolute spreads) computed in the following way:
Issuer' spread -Merrill Lynch average spread of issues with the same rating.
The Merrill Lynch index for spreads is established for the euro area and the sterling area. It covers corporate and banking issuers, according to the rating. 1 We consider the issuer rating before the rating action. Thus, if a corporate issuer in the euro area experiences a downgrade from Aa to A, for example, we examine the gap between the spread of the issuer and the average spread on corporate issues in the euro area, with an Aa rating during the whole period of the study. It is expected that the initial gap of the spread is close to zero but rises once investors react to the downgrade.
The observation window
For each issuer, the gap in the spread is measured for a window of 121 trading days, starting 60 days before the rating action and ending 60 days after.
Such a time span raises the problem of an eventual contamination by another event.
However, contamination can only result from other rating actions. Indeed, the rate of return on a fixed income bond is only likely to be affected by a modification in the risk free rate, a change in the market price of the risk of default, or a change in the risk of default of the bond.
By calculating the spread of the bond as the gap between the rate of return on the bond and the rate on government bonds with similar characteristics, the first factor is neutralized. The second factor is neutralized by studying abnormal spreads rather than absolute spreads.
Therefore, the only cause of variation in the gaps in spreads is the magnitude of the default risk in a given bond; this level of risk is normally measured by the rating agencies.
As a result, there may be contamination in the study, due to interference from two rating actions. In fact, this situation occurs from time to time. For example, an agency may include an issuer on a watchlist shortly before announcing an upgrade or a downgrade. Alternatively, since agencies' decisions are relatively consistent, a rating action from one of them is generally followed by similar actions from the others.
We assume that there is contamination between two rating actions when they are less than 70 trading days apart. When such contamination occurs, the reaction is attributed to the first event of the series of contaminated events, while other events are not taken into account.
Determining the investors' reactions
Our methodology implies identification and separation of the events that are neither followed nor preceded by any investors' reactions from the other events.
To begin, unit root tests are performed on the abnormal spreads, following Dallocchio et al. (2006) . An ADF test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979; 1981) 
where y t is the series of abnormal spreads, (t) is a linear trend and k is the number of lags included in the estimated equation, in order to deal with a possible autocorrelation and to increase the test reliability (Dickey and Fuller, 1981 ; Saïd and Dickey, 1985) . The number of lags, k, is chosen in order to minimize the Schwarz information criterion 3 . A non-stationarity hypothesis (which corresponds to a unit root, i.e., ρ = 1) is tested against a stationarity hypothesis (with ρ less than 1). A stationary series is characterized by the fact that it is not durably affected by an exogenous shock. A non-stationary series reacts to an exogenous shock and has a permanent memory process.
A series is stationary when it does not have a unit root (considering the p-value at 5% level) (McKinnon, 1996) . In this case, since the series does not react to the rating action, the rating event is considered as having no effect.
Following Perron (1989) , classical unit-root tests are known to bias results in favor of the unit root hypothesis. Indeed, when ADF or Phillips-Perron (1988) Perron (1997) , the series may:
-be confirmed as having a unit root (without any structural change);
-be stationary with a break (structural change);
-have a unit root with a structural change.
The first case did not occur in our sample, but the last two cases support the finding that there is a structural change. 4 We consider this break as the effect of a modification of investors' bond risk appreciation; this modification may occur before or after the agency's rating action. Perron (1989) suggests introducing a dummy variable that has a non-zero value on the day of the structural change. This method supposes knowing a priori when the structural change takes place. Subsequently, methods that consider the date of a possible break as unknown and endogenous have been developed, including those presented in Zivot and Andrews (1992) , Banerjee et al. (1992) , Perron and Vogelsang (1992) and Vogelsang and Perron (1998) . In this paper, we use the Perron (1997) test, which allows a structural change to occur under the null hypothesis (unit root) or the alternative hypothesis (stationarity).
The abnormal spread data series may be estimated as follows:
where T b is the (unknown) date of the structural break, DU t denotes the dummy variable for As the results of the test may strongly depend on the number of lags, k, we chose to select it endogenously, using the method proposed by Ng and Perron (1995) and Ben and Papell (1998) . First, the test is performed by taking into account the maximum number of lags; 5 if it is significant, 6 the procedure stops; if not, this step is repeated by lowering k by 1, until the rejection 'that additional lags are insignificant' is achieved.
Perron's model assumes that the errors in the formulated regressions are white noise.
Indeed, this model was initially built to deal with quarterly macroeconomic data over long periods. It is very likely that, when applying this model to higher frequency data (i.e., daily or weekly data), GARCH effects can be detected. Brooks and Rew (2002) attempted to determine the robustness of Perron's model in empirical applications, when both structural breaks and conditional heteroskedasticity are present, especially in daily data. By considering a previous theoretical framework (Nelson, 1990; 1992) and the simulations carried out by Baillie and Bollerslev (1989) with financial data, they first confirm that degeneracy and integratedness 7 of a GARCH process are expected to occur simultaneously. Then, they show that 'the effects of the integratedness and degeneracy together appear to counteract each other,' and that, 'in reality, as the process becomes increasingly degenerate and integrated, the volatility parameter 8 becomes smaller, (…) and the problem is reduced to the extent that Perron's asymptotes are approached' (Brooks and Rew, 2002: 170) . Consequently, they conclude 'that the Perron procedure (…) appears to be robust to the existence of a GARCH when it approximates that which we typically find in practice, as long as the magnitude of the break is small' 9 (ibid: 174). 5 We use Hayashi's (2000) criterion to specify the maximum value of k: k max . For a number of observations T, k max is equal to the entire part of: 12(T/100) 1/4 . 6 As suggested by Perron (1997) , we use a level of 10%. 7 Considering a GARCH(1,1) structure of the errors ε t and the related conditional variance: h t = φ 0 + φ 1 ε 2 t-1 + φ 2 h t-1 , a degenerated process refers to a value of φ 0 = 0, and an integrated process occurs when φ 1 + φ 2 =1 (φ 1 + φ 2 measuring the persistence of the variance process) 8 φ 1 in this example. 9 More precisely, they show that the presence of a GARCH process does not have a significant impact on the Given these results, we asume that Perron's procedure is appropriate to our analysis.
Dating of the structural changes
Our main objective is to date the structural changes in the series of abnormal spreads. The estimation procedure draws on the model of Perron (1997) and is similar to the methods used in other studies of financial events. For example, in their study of the perception of the U.S.
Civil War by financial markets, Willard et al. (1996) set up stationarity tests defined by Perron (1989) and Banerjee et al. (1992) . Oosterlinck (2003) applies the same methodology to bond series under France's Vichy government. Lastly, Waldenström and Frey (2008) use the model developed by Bai and Perron (1998; to analyze bond markets in Nordic countries in the period prior to World War II. Our approach is characterized by the very large number of datings that we carried out (about 350). Our estimation procedure is as follows. process that enables the optimal date of a breakpoint to be selected, but it does not need the reaction to take place in one specific day. Perron (1997) proposed two models, the additive outlier model (AO) and the innovational outlier model (IO). We used the IO2 model 11 that allows the break in the abnormal spreads to occur gradually, which seems more appropriate to our study.
test, except when the break in the mean of the series is in excess of five standard deviations, which is consistent with Perron's previous result (1997) . (Perron mentions 'that distorsions caused by large changes are not a problem in practice, but care should be used if a series is suspected to have a large intercept (θ) or slope (γ) change.') 10 According to Norden and Weber (2004) (cf. -For each of the 91 available equations, we select the optimal number of lags k, as described above (as the maximum number of lags k is 13, this represents a maximum number of 1183 equations and an average number of 546 equations estimated by spread series).
-Following the selection of k, among the 91 estimated equations only two are selected (where the coefficients of the dummies DU t and DT t are the most significant). These two equations allow the structural change to be dated.
This procedure is applied for each of the 350 series of spreads, which represents an average of 191 100 equations estimated for all of the studied events.
Perron (1997) suggests two different procedures for identification of the date T b of a structural change.
-Following Zivot and Andrews (1992) and Barnerjee et al. (1992) , by minimizing the tstatistic of the lagged variable coefficient ρ. This approach gives the most important weight to the alternative hypothesis of stationarity.
-By maximizing the t-statistic of the dummy variable associated with a break in the trend or the intercept (the direction of the variation, i.e., the sign of the estimated coefficient, may or may not be taken into account).
Given the importance of dating the structural changes in this research, we chose to apply the second method (taking into account the direction of variation 12 ). If both dates of break (for the trend or the intercept) are significant, we select the earlier of the two, which denotes the date of the investors' first reaction. If only one date of break is significant (for the trend or the intercept), we select that date. If none of the observed dummies is significant, the series does not exhibit a structural break.
12 The date T b of a break is determined by observing the maximum t-statistic if we expect an increase in the relative spread (downgrade or a negative watch) and the minimum t-statistic (upgrade or a positive watch). 
AA2
Negative watch
A1
Watch out
The abnormal spread of the bonds issued by this company during the 121-trading day period covering the date of the rating action is shown by Figure 1 , and the result of the Perron (1997) test by Table 2 . The dummy variable for the intercept (DU t ) is not significant, whereas the dummy variable for the trend (DT t ) is. The series shows a break in the trend at day 56 (September 9, 2000),
i.e., five trading days before the rating action, the downgrade by Moody's occurring at day 61.
Therefore, the day 56 would be selected as the date of the break.
Timeliness of ratings: agencies as information transmitters
Hypothesis
In this section we test the usual idea that the agency function is to transmit information about the issuer default risk to investors. In the light of new and credible information, we expect bond prices to react after the agency announcement. This idea is checked with our database.
The bond data set
The database includes 261 issuers and 868 rating actions stemming from the three major rating agencies working in the euro area and the UK over the period January 1, 1999-December 31, 2005. Tables 3 and 4 split this database according to the type of action and the rating agency. Most of the rating actions concern the euro area, as indicated by Table 4 . 
Rating events consistent with an investors' reaction
The results of our analysis concern the distinction between events for which we observe no statistically significant reaction in bond prices from events consistent with an investor reaction.
We study downgrades and negative watches and then upgrades and positive watches.
Downgrades and negative watches.
About one out of two events (precisely, 49%) is neither followed nor preceded by any investor reaction. For 51% of the events, we observe a structural change in the spread series.
In order to separate these two families of events, we performed a multi correspondence analysis (MCA) followed by a cluster analysis. The following variables were taken into account: the rating before the rating action, the year of the event, the number of notches in case of a downgrade, the country of the issuer, the reaction to the rating event (stationarity or structural change) and the 'specific industry' of the issuer.
As shown in Appendix A, Dimension 1 and Dimension 2 operate a satisfactory separation between the events consistent with an investor reaction (most of them on the left side of the graph) and the other events (most of them on the right of the graph).
A detailed analysis of the contribution of the main variables included in the MCA indicates that, for most of the events without any investor reaction, the initial rating of the issuer is above or equal to A2 (A), or the downgrade is only of one notch. Banks and financial companies from the euro area are mainly associated with such events; the reaction is not as clear for utilities and local authorities, despite the finding that for 58% of events in this category there is no investor reaction.
In contrast, rating actions are consistent with an investor reaction when the initial rating of the issuer is equal to or lower than A3 (A-) or when it is at least a two-notch downgrade. This category corresponds mostly to corporate companies, particularly those belonging to the telecommunication and automotive sectors, when the issuer is initially classified as 'speculative' in both the sterling and euro areas. Table 5 shows an important difference between investors' reactions concerning sterling issues versus euro issues. We also point out some differences relative to the rating agencies. Table 6 gives the proportion of events without any investor reaction according to the rating agency and the broad economic sector. Considered as a whole, this MCA, with a χ 2 test of independence, leads to the conclusion that there is not a significant difference (5% level) between the impact on spreads of downgrades and that of negative watches. Inclusion on a watch list does not seem to be the most significant agency action. More specifically, the reaction to a negative watch is quite similar to the reaction to a one-notch downgrade, with the reaction to a two-notch (and more)
downgrade being more important (Table 7) .
13 Despite the similarity in the reactions of investors, negative watches have been used more frequently by agencies. Table 8 shows the relative weight of downgrades and negative watches over time. 
Upgrades and positive watches.
Most of the time, these events are not consistent with an investor reaction: for a little more than two-thirds of the events (71%) there is no investor reaction, whereas only 29% result in a structural change in the spread series.
13 A χ 2 independence test allows the hypothesis of independence between the proportion of events consistent with an investor reaction and the type of rating grade action to be rejected. This conclusion is explained by the fact that the proportion of reactions that are 'two-notch or greater downgrades' is higher than the proportion that are 'one-notch downgrades' or 'negative watches.' The independence hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 5% level for a 'one-notch downgrade' and 'negative watch. ' We carried out an MCA to characterize these two families of events, followed by a cluster analysis-hierarchical classification (see Appendix B and Appendix C).
An upgrade or a positive watch is not consistent with an investor reaction when the initial rating of the issuer is equal to or higher than A3 (A-); this situation often occurs for many banks within the euro area, whose issues are in euros. On the other hand, this situation is also observed when the initial issuer level of risk before the upgrading is very high (particularly for issuers belonging to the 'consumer/retail' sector, for which the initial rating is equal to or lower than Ba1 or BB+).
Upgrades (or positive watches) are mainly consistent with an investors' reaction:
-in the case of banks with an initial rating equal to or higher than A3 or A-, for which issues are in sterling, or upgraded by Fitch; -in the case of corporate companies for which issues are in sterling (especially belonging to the telecom sector), with an initial rating between Baa1 (BBB+) and Baa3 (BBB-); -in the case of speculative corporate issuers upgraded by two notches or more.
We notice an important difference between events that involve sterling issues and euro issues, as indicated by Table 9 . There are very few positive watches: the partition of rating actions between positive watches and upgrades is 27% for positive watches and 73% for upgrades.
Partition of the events consistent with an investor reaction according to the date of the reaction.
In order to point out the common features and differences between the pre-rating action and post-rating action reactions, we perform a cluster analysis. We include the same variables in this analysis as we described previously, in addition to a variable that distinguishes between five possible periods of reaction to the event (i.e., the date of the structural change in the series of spreads). The options for this additional variable are as follows: the reaction occurs at least 10 days prior to the event, between three and nine days prior to the event, very near the event (+/-two days), between three days and nine days after the event, or at least 10 days after the event.
The cluster analysis of upgrades and positive watches does not provide any specific conclusion. Therefore, we continue leading the analysis on downgrades and negatives watches only. The partition of the 324 downgrades and negative watches consistent with an investor reaction according to the date of the spread reaction is as follows: 177 series react before the rating action, 147 react on date D of the rating action or after the rating action.
Negative watches are anticipated by investors more strongly than are downgrades (except for public and local authorities), as indicated by Table 10 . The results of the cluster analysis of downgrades and negative watches are summarized in Table 11 .
22 Table 11 Table 11 , we can distinguish two types of rated bond, two types of economic sector, and two types of agency.
Low-rated bonds can be contrasted with high-rated bonds. The downgrading (or inclusion on a watchlist) of low-rated bonds is often largely anticipated by investors at least three days before the rating action, and usually 10 days before, when the rating is equal to or lower than Baa3 (BBB-). The downgrading (or inclusion on a watchlist) of high-rated bonds leads the investor reaction (by at least 10 days for bonds rated between Aa2 and Aaa. Bonds rated between Baa2 and Aa3 are in the middle; the investor reaction mostly occurs before the rating action (or on the same day) when the issuer is a corporate company, and a little before or after when it is a bank.
Investor behavior concerning corporate issues is quite different from that concerning banking issues. Rating actions for corporate issues are largely anticipated by investors, while the opposite is observed for banking issues (except for some issues in sterling). issuers, it may be easier to disclose modifications to ratings before investor reaction than with high-risk issuers, because informed investors may not be very active in such low-risk market segments; we may think that informed investors are more concerned by credit analyses and rating actions when the initial rating of the issuer is low and the investors' potential gains are large. Then, the 'opacity' of financial institutions (Morgan, 2002) may explain late investor reaction.
Rating action and spread volatility: the function of rating agencies on European corporate bond markets
Once again, we focus on events consistent with investor reaction, and more precisely on downgrades and negative watches, because the analysis of the evolution of spread volatilities for upgrades and positive watches is inconclusive. We only study downgrades and negative watches anticipated by investors
Generally speaking, when markets (i.e., informed investors) anticipate a downgrade or a negative watch, the volatility of spreads 14 falls the day that the rating action is announced.
This result may be drawn from Table 12 . Table 12 is complemented by Table 13 , which shows the evolution of mean spreads before and after the announcement of a downgrade (or negative watch). Events for which the spread volatility decreases after the rating action 100 121
Events for which the spread volatility increases after the rating action 100 398
From the evidence of these two tables, it is interesting to search for the factors influencing the probability of volatility decreasing after the announcement, in case the market reaction (ie., the structural break) precedes these rating actions. In particular, there is a clue that the evolution of spread volatility is linked to the evolution of the spread level. To test this hypothesis, after checking for the absence of selection bias (Heckman, 1979; Berk, 1983) , 15 we performed a logit model aiming to explain the probability of a decrease in spread volatility after the rating action. In order to to this, we separated out events significantly associated with a decrease in the annualized standard error of the abnormal spread (according to the Fisher test, 5% risk level). The dependent variables, included as dummies, were: the evolution of the abnormal spread level after the agency announcement, classified in quartiles (i.e, a decrease or an increase less or equal to 10 BP, corresponding to the upper limit of the second quartile); the currency of the issue; the rating agency that made the announcement; the issuer's sector;
and the level of the issuer's rating before the rating action. The detailed output of the model is included in Appendix D, while Table 14 summarizes the significant variables and their influence. The estimation of a logit model carried out on a restricted sample of the events for which a reaction occurred (in this case, prior to the announcement) raises the question of a possible selection bias. The use of Berk's proposed methodology (1983) , following Heckman (1979) , made it possible to check whether or not this problem arose. This procedure includes a variable allowing the possible selection bias to be estimated in the socalled 'selection equation' (estimated on the restricted sample only). In our study, the coefficient of the parameter taking into account the selection bias did not turn out to be significant (coefficient: 0.278; p-value = 0.87; H(0): absence of bias). Among the significant results that can be drawn from this table, it is noticeable that when the volatility of an issuer's spread decreases after an announcement, it is more likely to be associated with stabilization or a small increase in its risk premium on the bond market (Q1 or Q2). Indeed, the odds of a decrease in the volatility of the issuer's abnormal spread after the announcement are about three times as large when the average risk premium of the issuer belongs to the two first quartiles (respectively 2.78 for quartile 1 and 3.193 for quartile 2) rather than to the two last.
Ceteris paribus, a rating by Moody's also seems to influence positively the probability of a decrease in spread volatility (odds ratio: 2.2), and so does an issue in sterling rather than euros (odds ratio: 2.3). Concerning banking/finance or public/utilities activity, it seems that when the reaction occurs before the announcement, the announcement does not push the spread to stabilize and the odds of a decrease in volatility are less than 1 (respectively 0.24 and 0.33).
So, two different sub-groups of events can be identified: -The first is characterized by stabilization of the average spread and a fall in spread volatility after the rating action. In this case, the rating action is consistent with the variation in spreads observed in the markets and confirms the reaction of informed investors. This convergence in assessment by the markets (i.e., informed investors) and the rating agency homogenizes all investors' expectations. It stabilizes the average spread and reduces spread volatility. For such issuers, the function of the agency is no longer to transmit information relative to the default risks of an issuer, but to certify the assessment of informed investors. Its usefulness in the bond markets is not to allow a fair value for bonds to emerge but rather to stabilize bond prices.
-The second sub-group is characterized by a rise in the average spread and volatility of spreads, after the rating action. In this case, the rating action may refute the assessment of informed investors. Such a refutation does not, of course, relate to the direction of the variation (a fall in the credit quality of the issuer), but to its size. The announcement by the agency is judged as being more pessimistic than the previously observed market reaction.
Such incoherence relating to the scale of the phenomenon leads to greater investor uncertainty and hence greater average spreads, as well as to heightened heterogeneity of expectations and greater spread volatilities. The function of the agency is thus exactly the opposite of the previous case; it refutes the point of view of informed investors, which has a destabilizing effect on bond prices.
Conclusion
In opposition to classical studies relying on cumulative abnormal returns, our study relies on unit root and structural change tests, which allow each rating action to be considered separately and its impact to be characterized according to issuer and type of action.
Most of the time, for rating actions concerning euro issues, there is no investor reaction. For upgrades and positive watches, this trend is observed for three out of four rating actions. For downgrades and negative watches, the trend is observed for one out of two rating actions. We notice an important difference with sterling issues: for half of the upgrades or positive watches there are no spread reactions, while the ratio relative to downgrades (or negative watches) is one out of four.
Inclusion on a watch list does not seem to be the most significant action of an agency:
concerning the rating actions consistent with investor reaction, negative watches are anticipated by informed investors a little more strongly than downgrades and do not lead to greater market reaction.
We can distinguish two segments in the market for which the CRA function is different.
-The first segment is made up of euro area banking and financial issuers, whose initial ratings are usually between Aaa (AAA) and A2 (A). Fitch, the youngest agency, is very active in this segment. Spread reaction generally occurs after the rating action. This result could stem from the 'opacity' of financial institutions or from their low credit risk level, the stakes also being low for investors. For these issuers, the CRA function remains to transmit information about issuer default risk.
-For the corporate sector, or, more specifically, those corporations that have ratings lower than or equal to Baa3 (BBB-), investor reaction generally precedes rating action. The two oldest agencies, Moody's and Standard & Poor's, are very present in this market segment.
The CRA function is no longer to transmit information about issuers' default risk, as investors (or at least, informed investors) do this first. But this does not mean that rating agencies' actions are useless. By announcing their rating action, the agencies confirm (or not) the informed investors' perception of the issuer default risk. This certification function is important in bond markets because, if the agency ratings are trustworthy, they will stop an interrogation stemming from the uninformed investors after a change in spreads. When disclosing its rating modifications and confirming (or not) the informed investor reaction, a credible agency stabilizes (or not) bond prices. Spread stabilization appears to be the actual function of rating agencies in European corporate bond markets. -9.3 -8.1 -11.4 -15.7 -4.2 | -0.72 -0.63 -0.89 -1.22 -0.33 
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